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ABSTRACT
The dichotomy of barbarism and progress has long been a focal point 
for the discussions about Russia’s past and present. The discourse on 
Russian barbarism had been known in Europe since at least 16th century, 
but Enlightenment thinkers gave it a new shape by juxtaposing the 
ancient conception of barbarism with the rather modern idea of progress. 
In this article, Enlightenment historical writings are examined; the focus 
is on the question of how Russian history was studied in order to find 
signs of barbarism and the different guises of progress. The primary 
sources for the article are mainly Russian historical writings; however, 
relations and interactions between Russian and European intellectuals, 
as well as intellectual exchange and influence, are also noted. As there 
were no word “civilization” in 18th-century Russian, enlightenment 
was deemed by Russian thinkers as the antipode to barbarism. It is 
concluded that most Enlightenment writers saw Christianization as 
a step forward from barbarism in Russian history. Parallels between 
Russia and Scandinavia as they were drawn by August Schlözer are 
also analyzed. The article shows how the idea of conflict between 
barbarism and progress altered the understanding of Russian history 
in the Enlightenment. 
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Introduction
The discourse on issues of barbarism and civilization in relation to Russia have 
been well studied in the recent academic literature. Several volumes containing 
quite thorough research into the subject have appeared over the last three decades 
(Scheidegger, 1993; Wolff, 1994; Poe, 2001; Velizhev, 2019). There is also an endless 
list of less comprehensive academic and popular books and articles dedicated 
to the search for Russia’s place among civilized or underdeveloped nations with 
assessments of the various primary and secondary sources. However, despite how 
massive the literature is, there is still a lack of works discussing the ways in which 
ideas of barbarism and progress were used in the study of Russian history during the 
Enlightenment. This caesura is the reason I decided to join the international horde of 
scholars by making a small contribution to this astonishingly dense field.
As is obvious, the subject of barbarism, progress, and civilization in Russia is 
infinitely greater than the scope of a journal article. I have no intention of offering 
a comprehensive treatment of the subject. My goal is to study an Enlightenment 
perspective on barbarism and its opposites (enlightenment or civilization) in Russia’s 
history with an emphasis on interpretations of the conflict between barbarism 
and progress. In other words, this study is focused on the Enlightenment vision of 
barbarism and civilization in the Russian past, the numerous meanings that the term 
barbarism had, and the role of the phenomena in country’s history. I will try to show 
divergent opinions on the history of Russian society and its change (or inability to 
change) from barbaric to civilized. Historical treatises on Russia which lack the word 
barbarism or challenge the idea that Russia was once a barbaric commonwealth are 
also worthy of note. 
In this work, I will pursue the goals and approaches usual for intellectual history. 
Probably, the most useful methodological approaches belong to the German and 
Anglo-Saxon schools: here, I refer to the German school of Reinhart Koselleck 
(Begriffsgeschichte) and the Cambridge-born Anglo-Saxon “history of concepts” (the 
main figures of which are Quentin Skinner and John Pocock). Both approaches are 
relevant for my study, but Skinner and Pocock’s methods will be employed to a greater 
extent. Skinner’s methodology has won wide acclaim in Russian academia in recent 
years (Timofeev, 2015) and has seen great success in studies of political ideas and 
social processes (Bugrov, 2015; Redin & Soboleva, 2017; Prikazchikova, 2018), and 
even in the studies of administrative development (Kiselev & Graber, 2015; Lazarev, 
2017) during the Russian Enlightenment. 
This study is mainly based on 18th-century Russian historical writings, as 
Russia’s history was rarely examined closely in other European languages during 
the Enlightenment. There is another reason for the choice of source base: different 
European traditions and languages in the 18th century possessed slightly different 
understandings of civilization and progress. In French, civilization was more often used 
to talk about education and the refinement of manners (the French word civilisation 
was often translated as “polished” in 18th-century English); in Britain, civilization was 
more about economics, the perception of civil rights, industrial development, and 
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social progress; and in German the term had close ties with culture and the nation’s 
spirit (Velizhev, 2019, pp. 34–50). 
The types of historical writings used in this study vary from long narratives 
(Tatishchev, 1768; Shcherbatov, 1770; Karamzin, 1818) to reviews and publicist 
works (Boltin, 1788; Karamzin, 1991). It is difficult to draw a line between academic 
and amateur Enlightenment historical writing. Both groups are studied together in 
the Russian historiography, since the works of non-professional and professional 
historians had much in common in the 18th century.
It is necessary to describe how barbarism in Russian history was categorized, 
which nations were considered barbaric, and on which occasions the term was applied. 
It is also necessary to provide a comparative perspective. That means observing how 
historical Russians, their society, customs, etc., were juxtaposed to or equated with 
neighboring nations and societies. The primary sources mostly originate between 
1750 and 1820. Although the word barbarism can be encountered in the connection to 
Russian history before 1750, the idea of a conflict between barbarism and progress 
had not yet clearly emerged. By 1820, the Enlightenment historical perspective had 
evolved into something very different, and therefore deserves special study. 
European Notions of the “Barbarian” in Relation to Russia  
and 18th-Century Dictionaries
The historiography shows that the first modern accounts of travelers and various 
thinkers contained ideas about Russia’s barbarian past and/or present. As the first 
eyewitness testimonies arrived, later travelers and writers began to expect barbarity 
and ignorance in Russia, especially from the common people: the whole country was 
branded as barbarous or savage. For example, the English traveler and merchant 
Richard Chancellor, despite his admiration for the Ivan the Terrible’s court, called the 
people “barbarous Russes” (Cross, 2012, p. 18). Giles Fletcher, who was on a mission 
to Russia in 1588, was very critical of Russia’s “true and strange face of a tyrannical 
state […] without true knowledge of God, without written law, without common justice” 
(Fletcher, 1591, Epistle). As Anthony Cross writes: “For many in Britain, Russia 
represented an unknown; it conjured up images of a barbaric people living in arctic 
cold and ruled by tyrannical despots – a view established by English travel accounts 
of the 16th century” (Cross, 2012, p. 92). 
All these stereotypes about Moscovia were common across Europe. Even those 
who had some sympathy towards Russia were certain that Russians had a kind of 
barbarous history. They were “formerly called Scythians” (Wolff, 1994, p. 10), as 
Captain Jacques Margeret put it, and were surrounded by “the most vile and barbarous 
nation of all the world (Cogley, 2005, p. 781). 
Furthermore, in some European languages the words Moscow and Muscovite 
had negative connotations. For instance, there is the Italian word Moscoviteria, a 
derogatory literary designation of behaviour supposedly characteristic of Russians: 
the term Muscovite “could be equated with Asiatic” (Berezovich & Krivoshchapova, 
2015, pp. 132, 147).
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However, only in the 18th century was the almost unequivocally acknowledged 
barbarism of Russia placed on a scale of progress according to which all nations could 
be measured in compliance with universal laws of social development: this replaced 
the rather vague juxtaposition of Russia with “our” culture or religion, as was common 
among 16th- and 17th-century writers. As Larry Wolff has accurately concluded, “it was 
[...] the Enlightenment […] that cultivated and appropriated to itself the new notion 
of “civilization”, an eighteenth-century neologism, and civilization discovered its 
complement, within the same continent, in shadowed lands of backwardness, even 
barbarism” (Wolff, 1994, p. 4). Paradoxically, the idea of Russia’s barbarism was 
reinforced at the time, when the country became much better known due to its military 
victories and active diplomatic travelling of tsar Peter (Redin & Serov, 2017, p. 477).
At the beginning of the 19th century, the discourse of barbarism and civilization 
even became a tool for justifying Napoleon’s campaign against the Russian Empire. 
There are numerous accounts of soldiers and officers from the 1812 campaign who 
labeled Russia “a barbaric country” and branded Russians as “barbarians”. Napoleon 
himself on Saint Helena claimed that “the courage of the French was defeated by 
frost, the fire of Moscow and Russian barbarism” (Segur, 1859, p. 311). Thus, the 
conflict between the two empires was interpreted as a conflict between barbarism and 
progress (civilization). 
Civilization was represented in this conflict by Western Europe. Russia, due to 
its position on the map, was perceived as an Asiatic country, even if it possessed a 
European façade in the form of its capital. Count de Segur, a French envoy to Russia 
in 1784–1789, described St. Petersburg as a combination of “the age of barbarism 
and that of civilization, the tenth and the eighteenth centuries, the manners of Asia 
and those of Europe, coarse Scythians and polished Europeans” (Segur, 1859, 
pp. 329–330). His son Philippe-Paul, an army general who took part in the Russian 
campaign of 1812 and became the author of a memoir, used “barbarism” quite often, 
although mostly in relation to Cossacks or Bashkirs. 
The position of Russia in between the civilized and barbaric worlds became a 
typical matter for reflection in the first decades of the 19th century both in Russia and 
in the West. In his Lettres philosophiques, Chaadaev wrote that Russia is “situated 
between East and West, resting with one elbow on China and the other on Germany”: 
“We should have combined within ourselves these two principles of intelligent nature 
imagination and reason, and unite in our civilization the histories of the whole globe” 
(Aizlewood, 2000, p. 28). Writing in French and using the word “civilization” quite 
frequently, Chaadaev was deeply pessimistic about the past and future of Russia. “We 
belong”, he wrote, “neither to the West nor to the East”: “We are an exception among 
peoples. We belong to those who are not an integral part of humanity but exist with 
the sole goal to teach the world some type of a pitiful lesson” (Aizlewood, 2000, p. 29).
Unlike “civilization”, the term “barbarism” has had a much longer history and 
possessed quite similar meanings in major European languages in the 18th century. 
The literal meaning of “barbarian, barbarous” etc. was “non-Greek or Roman tribes, 
which once lived by the borderline of those ancient states”. However, this meaning 
was quite specific, and another, figurative meaning was very widespread. Figuratively, 
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“barbarism”, as it was defined in an English dictionary from 1708, meant “inhumanity, 
cruelty”, while “barbarous” referred to “wild or rude people” (Kersey, 1708). 
Ten years later, Nouveau Dictionnaire de l’Académie Françoise provided almost 
the same meanings for barbare and barbarie, but with two significant additions. 
According to the French Academy, barbarous could mean “lack of politeness”. 
Barbarian or barbarous more often than not referred to a “broken language”, “a 
language, which has no relation to ours and which is harsh and shocking” (Nouveau 
Dictionnaire, 1718, p. 131). 
Twelve years down the line, the new Dictionarium Britannicum mentioned both 
new meanings: “Barbarous […] savage, wild, rude; also improper with respect to 
speech”; “barbarism […] an impropriety of speech, a rudeness in language” (Bailey, 
1730). “A form of speech contrary to the purity of language” was the first meaning of 
“barbarism” offered in the 1768 edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (Johnson, 1768). 
In 1781, the same definition was the first one provided for barbarisch in Grammatisch-
kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, a dictionary of the German 
language by Johann Adelung (Adelung, 1781). All dictionaries maintained “cruelty, 
cruel” as the proper synonyms for “barbarity, barbarous”. 
By the last decades of the 18th century, the situation had changed significantly. 
With the appearance of a clear antonym for barbarism (i.e. civilization), the meaning 
of this long-extant word began to change. From the 1770s, the conception of 
“civilized or polished nations” influenced the meanings of barbarism in European 
languages. For example, the British clergyman and historian William Tooke when 
writing about Russia held that without “agriculture […] the nations would be called 
savage”, while without commerce “they might be deemed barbarous” (Tooke, 1799, 
p. 231). This judgement is characteristically 18th-century British due to the peculiar 
perception of civilization as a term describing economic and social development. 
Such a view was not universally shared in France or Germany. However, there were 
some remarkable exceptions, such as the Göttingen professor August Schlözer, an 
anglophile and historian of Russia who maintained an understanding of barbarism 
and civilization very close to Tooke’s. The influence of Schlözer’s research was 
immense, particularly in the Russian Empire of Alexander I. 
Barbarism Versus Progress in Russian History 
The word barbarian and its derivatives can be found in the Russian language long 
before the 18th century. Obviously, the term was borrowed from Greek and became 
popular in Mediaeval Rus’. “Barbarian, barbarism, barbarous” had both literal and 
figurative meanings in Russian, as was the case in English, German, and French. The 
Russian Primary Chronicle called the cruel Biblical tribes barbarians. In 13th-century 
Old Church Slavonic texts, barbarism was a typical synonym for heresy (Avanesov, 
1988, p. 359). 17th-century Russian inherited the latter meaning. In the Kievan Synopsis 
of 1674, the word barbarians is applied only to the Mongols and was often collocated 
with the adjective nechestivyi or zlochestivui (Kievskiĭ sinopsis, 1836, pp. 125, 158), 
literally dishonourable and figuratively sinful, godless or impious. Nechestivyi was 
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routinely interchangeable with pagan or non-Christian in the language of the time 
(Shmelёv, 1986, p. 350).
The first comprehensive dictionary of the Russian Academy refers to the same 
two (literal and figurative) meanings of barbarian and its derivatives. It points out 
that the figurative meaning of barbarian was more popular in Russian at the time. 
Barbarous, according to the dictionary, meant “cruel, fierce, and inhuman” (Slovar’ 
akademii rossiĭskoĭ, 1789, p. 492). However, the Academy’s dictionary, unlike its 
European counterparts, does not include the meaning “broken language”; apparently, 
this meaning did not exist in 18th-century Russian. 
 Barbarism had several meanings in the historical writings of the Russian 
Enlightenment. First, Russian authors used this term in the ancient style: barbarians are 
peoples outside Greece and Rome. The Scythians, Sarmatians, Goths, Roxolanians, 
and others were called barbarians, with references to ancient and Byzantine writers 
(Lomonosov, 1766, p. 51; Tatishchev, 1768, pp. 40, 123, 125; Shcherbatov, 1770, 
pp. 136, 49, 114). Figuratively, barbarism was often used as a synonym for cruelty, 
just as in most other European languages (Shcherbatov, 1770, p. 291; Shlёtser, 1819, 
p. 223; Karamzin, 1991, p. 94).
Enlightenment Russian historians did not regard Russia as Asia. On the contrary, 
they believed that barbarians like the Huns or Mongols brought barbarism to Russia 
from Asia (Karamzin, 1818, p. 43). Catherine the Great stated in her Nakaz of 1768 
that “Russia is a European state” (Velizhev, 2019, p. 71), and Russian intellectuals 
seemed to share this view. In the 18th century, Russia did not associate itself with Asia 
and connected barbarism with Asian tribes. This distinguished 18th-century Russian 
thinkers from their contemporaries in the West and from later Russian thinkers, who, 
like Chaadaev, the Slavophiles, and 20th-century disciples of Eurasianism, saw Russia 
as at least semi-Asian.
The Slavs were regarded by Greek and Roman authors as barbarians. 18th-century 
Russian historians seemed to accept this in two respects. Sometimes (although still 
quite rarely), they directly called the Slavs barbarians. Another method was to call the 
whole epoch barbarous, thus moving the emphasis from their ancestors to a vaguely 
determined area or group of nations.
It seems that the barbarism of the Slavs was a matter for debate, but the number 
and quality of works written in defense of these ancient ancestors was limited. Such 
texts are mostly restricted to the so-called “Norman” or “Varangian” question, which 
made its first appearance in 1749 during a discussion between Gerhard Miller and 
Mikhail Lomonosov, professors of the Academy. Miller, following his mentor Gottlieb 
Bayer, proclaimed that the Varangians (Scandinavians) had once ruled over Russia 
and founded its first dynasty. Lomonosov set out his objections, postulating that the 
Slavs had their own rulers. In the following decades, both sides had their disciples. 
However, this early discussion had very little to do with the issues of social 
development, progress, etc. The divisive issue was ethnicity, principally the ethnic 
origin of Russia’s first princes. To this the idea of glory and splendor of national history 
was added. Both sides believed that conquests, battles, plunder, and military victories 
were symbols of national glory. In this respect, barbaric Slavic acts at the dawn of 
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their history were praised rather than dismissed. Lomonosov’s fierce response to the 
idea of the Scandinavian origin of the Rurikids was grounded in the same logic: if the 
first prince of Russia (Rurik) had been a Scandinavian, this would bring disgrace on 
the Russian people (Bugrov & Sokolov, 2018, pp. 107–108). This is why although the 
word barbarian was (rather rarely) invoked by Miller and Lomonosov, neither found 
any conflict between barbarism and progress in the first centuries of Russian history. 
Moreover, Lomonosov did not hesitate to use “barbarian, barbarous” in reference to 
the Slavs (Lomonosov, 1766, pp. 19, 79).
Along with the negative connotations of the word barbarism, the concept of 
the noble savage also existed in 18th-century literature. This idea embodies the 
notion of people as yet uncorrupted by civilization. Many of the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment held that humans have an innate moral sense, a mirror of humanity’s 
inherent goodness. This goodness can be preserved, but it is threatened by a “dirty” 
and immoral modern world. 
It is interesting that Enlightenment European writers of the 18th century showed 
no inclination to portray contemporary Russians and their ancient ancestors as noble 
savages. Most probably, Russians did not resemble the sentimental archetypal look of 
a noble savage, in contrast to the native Americans or some other peoples discovered 
by Europeans. However, the idea of a noble savage had its place in 18th-century 
Russian historical writings. For example, Mikhail Shcherbatov applied this notion 
to the ancient Scythians, who once had “a higher standard of morals than the most 
learned nation in the world [the Greeks]” (Shcherbatov, 1770, p. 10).
In the 18th century, there were two main approaches to the conflict between 
barbarism and progress. The first approach, which can be called “cultural” and 
had its roots in Greco-Roman narratives, implied that civilization is under constant 
danger from barbarism. The danger may come from without or from within (Ionov & 
Khachaturian, 2002, pp. 61–78). A great example of the practical application of this 
approach can be found in Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire. Gibbon portrayed the fall of Rome as a result of a deluge of barbarians 
made possible by internal crisis (Gibbon, 1891, p. 113). Even more interestingly, Gibbon 
fantasized about the possibility of a new barbaric invasion into Europe. He seems 
optimistic and suggests that European nations (including Russia) would withstand the 
invaders together (Gibbon, 1891, p. 493). Such a union of “civilized” nations would 
be unimaginable without a complete understanding of a principal conflict between 
civilization and barbarism. 
Another approach was represented by a linear conception of progress. Adam 
Ferguson, a Scottish philosopher, was probably the first to introduce this approach 
in his Essay on the History of the Civil Society. Ferguson believed that every society 
goes through the same three stages in its social development. The three consecutive 
stages are: savageness, barbarism, and civilization (enlightenment) (Ferguson, 1782). 
This approach does not necessarily imply conflict, as barbarism was seen only as 
a stage. However, barbarous nations are such not because they are insufficiently 
“polished”: their aggression is caused by the pursuit of material goods, not an intense 
hatred of civilization. This approach became popular in Russia after 1800, when 
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British philosophy became better known. At the same time, August Schlözer’s book 
about early Russian history was published: he promoted the Fergusonian triad. 
At this time, the period when historians ascribed striving for glory to the ancient 
barbarians as a motive for military campaigns was coming to an end. The discourse on 
“glorious deeds and greatness” fell into decline: in its place, the main characteristics of 
barbarians became seeking profit (“predation”) and amorality. Karamzin wrote that the 
barbarian invasion of Rome (which had earlier often been attributed to the Slavs) was 
caused not by the desire for glory, but the appetite for prey “which the Huns, Goths, 
and other peoples possessed: the Slavs sacrificed their lives to this, and were not 
inferior to other barbarians in this regard” (Karamzin, 1818, p. 58).
However, during the second half of the 18th and the early 19th centuries, the 
concept of “civilization” did not yet exist in the Russian language. As such, it is not 
fully correct to talk about a contraposition between barbarianism and civilisation. 
Nonetheless, the French word civilisation was well known among the European 
educated elites, who spoke French well. The French phrase “civilisation en Russie” 
would not have surprised the literate Russian public, since it was used in one of the 
chapters of Denis Diderot’s book (Mezin, 2016).
Instead of the dichotomy between barbarism and civilisation, we find in 
18th-century Russian an opposition between barbarism and enlightenment. Indeed, 
the concept of “enlightenment” was so close to the meaning of “civilisation”, which 
became entrenched in Russian in the 1830s, precisely because the former was placed 
in opposition to barbarism by Russian history writers at the end of the 18th century. One 
of the meanings of enlightenment was the “softening of morals”, society’s achievement 
of a certain level of culture. The “softening of morals” was pointed out as one of the 
possible meanings of “civilization” in the Complete Dictionary of Foreign Words 
published in 1861 (Geĭze, 1861, p. 549). Mikhail Velizhev observes that this was the 
first dictionary to cement the concept of civilisation in Russian, but we should note 
that Ivan Poplavskii’s German-Russian dictionary of 1856 directly connected the two 
concepts (Velizhev, 2019, pp. 81–83). The other meaning of the word enlightenment, 
education, was also maintained in the 19th century as one of the meanings of the 
concept of “civilisation”.
As soon as “enlightenment” was designated as a synonym for the later concept 
of civilization (at least in Russian), the opposition between barbarism and civilization 
could be extended to enlightenment. At the turn of the 18th century, barbarism was 
seen not only as alien to enlightenment but also as openly hostile to it. Nikolai Karamzin 
pointed out in his History of the Russian State that the conflict between barbarians 
and the Roman Empire was not merely a military conflict, but a horrible long-term war 
between “barbarism and civil enlightenment, which eventually ended with the downfall 
of the latter” (Karamzin, 1818, p. 12). In the war against civilized nations, barbarians 
always had an upper hand and a near certain chance of winning. This was not just 
because of their ferocity, military capabilities, or indefatigable character. Civilized or 
enlightened nations are susceptible to laziness and the corruption of morals, the main 
reason for their defeat. As Karamzin wrote, “pampered by luxury, Rome lost its noble 
pride together with its civil liberty” (Karamzin, 1818, p. 12). 
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However, the invasion of barbarians did not necessarily lead to the complete 
destruction of a civilized nation. Barbarians might enslave a more civilized nation 
instead of eliminating it. Although such enslavement certainly brought absolute 
disgrace on a nation, it gave its people a chance for future liberation. 18th-century 
Russian writers stated unequivocally that the Mongols were barbarians. The period of 
the Mongol rule was deemed a “yoke” (igo in Russian): barbarous was often the word 
used to describe it. It is interesting that Russian and European historians employed 
the same words about the period. In his History of Russia, William Tooke labeled 
the Mongols as barbarians, writing that they “marked their footsteps with barbarities 
and devastations”; he characterized the period of Mongol rule in Russia as “the 
yoke of the barbarians” (Tooke, 1800, pp. 240, 327). Tooke’s contemporary Nikolai 
Karamzin, in the Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, called the period between 
the 13th and 15th centuries the “barbaric time of the Khan’s yoke”, noting that the 
Russian people “tamed by the barbarian yoke thought only how to save their lives and 
property and cared very little about civil rights” (Karamzin, 1991, pp. 22, 78). Earlier 
in the 18th century, Archbishop Feofan (Prokopovich) invoked the “barbarian yoke” to 
describe the aftermath of the Mongol invasion. 
Moreover, 18th-century authors saw enlightenment as a reversible process. The 
entire matter could be returned to an earlier stage thanks to either internal or external 
reasons. The Mongol invasion was viewed as an obstacle in the path of Russia’s 
progress and was believed to have had a hugely detrimental effect on Russia’s morals, 
culture, literacy, and politics. From the 18th-century point of view, other events might 
also contribute and reverse the progress of enlightenment. Schlözer believed that 
the enlightenment of Russia, triggered by the introduction of Christianity, had been 
interrupted by “internal strife and the raids of the Kipchaks and the Mongols” and had 
therefore been postponed for 400 years (Shlёtser, 1816, p. 181). All the cases mentioned 
by Schlözer represent incursions of barbarism into the territory of enlightenment. For 
a historical writer of the 18th century, the Mongols and Kipchaks were two barbarian 
nations, and the ruthless strife between the Russian princes was by no means an 
example of enlightened behaviour. Furthermore, Schlözer sincerely believed that the 
Russian conquest of Siberia had seriously damaged the enlightenment in Russia 
because the region was peopled with savage tribes. 
Christianization as Civilization 
It was almost a universal idea among Russian scholars from 1750 to 1820 that Russia 
took a path towards enlightenment after the baptism by Prince Vladimir in 988. Mikhail 
Shcherbatov wrote about the event: “The gloom of idolatry was changed thanks to the 
light of the holy Gospels, presenting to us a new condition in Russia: ferocious hearts 
softened by good moral teachings no longer appear barbarian to us. Although the 
ancient severity and remnants of idolatry still often occurred, virtues either equal to them 
or exceeding them presented themselves before our eyes” (Shcherbatov, 1770, p. 271).
Ivan Boltin, on many occasions an opponent of Shcherbatov, agreed with him that 
Christianity began to enlighten Russia. Moreover, he pointed out the forceful character 
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of the baptism and explained that the Eastern Slavs withstood Christianization 
because of the principal conflict between their ignorance and paganism. This was a 
new explanation for the presumed conflict at the time of Christianization (Boltin, 1788, 
p. 543). At the beginning of the 19th century, Schlözer concluded that “the introduction 
of the Christian faith was” the strongest possible impetus for enlightenment (Shlёtser, 
1816, p. 181).
For enlightenment thinkers, the most important thing was that baptism brought 
with it not only faith but also Christian morality. Shcherbatov wrote that “Christian 
law, when directly understood, instructed us to honour our unity with our brothers: 
as a consequence of this teaching, barbarism was suppressed at its very roots” 
(Shcherbatov, 1774, p. 121). Lomonosov concluded that Princess Ol’ga “turned her 
thoughts to Christian law, in which she saw greater humaneness and enlightenment 
than in the earlier barbaric ignorance” (Lomonosov, 1766, p. 79). In his essays, 
M. M. Shcherbatov called the Greeks from whom Rus received baptism an “enlightened 
people” (Shcherbatov, 1770, p. 270).
One of the main characteristics of an enlightened society was held to be its high 
level of morality in comparison with the preceding epoch (or, as Shcherbatov put 
it, its “softened morals”) (Shcherbatov, 1770, p. 270). In contrast, barbarian society 
was characterised by its crude morality, which constituted its social unenlightened 
condition. According to views from the era of the Enlightenment, barbarian crudity in 
moral matters would be gradually overcome. Some historians, such as Shcherbatov, 
suggested that the meaning and content of historical development were determined 
by the “softening” and “improvement” of morality. Discussing the baptism of Rus, 
he wrote that upon Princess Ol’ga’s conversion to Christianity the new religion did 
not successfully spread “because of the crudeness of morals” (Shcherbatov, 1770, 
p. 269). Rudeness was a characteristic of Prince Vladimir before Christianization. 
He conquered Cherson in Crimea and demanded baptism in return for the town. 
Immediately after the baptism his personality changed: unlike barbarians he kept his 
promise and returned Cherson untouched. It is interesting that real Vladimir probably 
destroyed the town, at least archaeological findings can be interpreted this way 
(Romantchuk, 2016, p. 204).
Enlightenment through baptism was sometimes connected with the spread of 
literacy. The Russian Primary Chronicle noted Prince Vladimir’s foundation of a 
school: “He took the children of the best families, and sent them for instruction in book-
learning” (Cross & Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953, p. 117). Historians of the Enlightenment 
necessarily focused on this fact (Shcherbatov, 1770, p. 215). Schools were important 
not only because they made people more educated but also because they facilitated 
the “softening of morals”. In Shcherbatov’s conception, Prince Vladimir very well 
understood “that the seven Holy Gospels, sown everywhere, could not take root in 
peoples converted from idolatry if the previous severity and ignorance [continued] to 
abide in them: for this reason, he instructed that a school be established” (Shcherbatov, 
1770, p. 272).
Baptism was probably regarded as an escape from barbarism and a start to the 
enlightenment of the nation because the word prosveshchenie (enlightenment) has 
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close ties with religion in the Russian language. A modern dictionary of medieval 
Russian gives “baptism” as one of the five meanings of the verb prosveshchati – “ to 
enlighten”. According to the dictionary, the noun prosveshchenie can be used not only 
as a substitute for the word baptism but also as a synonym for “a space where baptism 
takes place, a baptistery” (Bogatova, 1995, pp. 213–214). 
Christian people could again become barbarians if they persecuted religion 
and the church. A remark of I. P. Elagin’s in an unpublished section of his Experience 
of Telling Stories about Russia is entirely indicative of this notion. Discussing the 
contemporary situation, Elagin wrote that the most beastly habits were currently being 
observed among the Turks and the French (this was during the events of the French 
Revolution). Elagin called both peoples barbarians (Elagin, 1791). Of course, calling 
the French a “barbarian people” might have been connected with more than just the 
persecution of the church; however, the context of Elagin’s comments allows us to 
suggest that it was the rejection of Christian morality by the Muslim Turks and the 
atheist French that, in his view, made these nations barbaric. It is curious that Schlözer, 
when discussing the same “anarchic” times of the French Revolution, did not refuse 
the French the title of enlightened nation; however, he did decisively condemn their 
crimes. Thus, each historian individually made their own decision about whether to 
label contemporary European countries as barbarian. In any case, by the end of the 
18th century a specific set of barbaric characteristics had been formulated, which 
included crudity, ignorance, murderousness, rejection of religion and the church, and 
other crimes.
From the point of view of Russian history writers, enlightenment by means of 
baptism was not equal to true Enlightenment in the spirt of the 18th century. Rather, 
baptism was considered a step to enlightenment, the beginning of a long path; 
nonetheless, without this step, reason would never triumph. Furthermore, Christianity 
was portrayed as a sort of surrogate of Enlightenment for those social estates in 
which reason and science had yet to flourish due to their lowly position. In this regard, 
it necessary to once again turn to Shcherbatov’s essays, which are well known for 
their critical attitude towards the enlightenment of the peasantry. In his essay “On 
the Corruption of Morals in Russia”, he demonstrated that the measures taken by 
Peter the Great against superstition had both positive and negatives consequences. 
Shcherbatov considered the main negative consequence to be the “harm” done to 
peasant morality: “At a time when the nation was still unenlightened […] by taking 
superstition away from an unenlightened people, he [Peter] removed its very faith 
in God’s law […] superstition decreased, but so did faith”. “Morals”, concludes 
Shcherbatov, “for lack of any other [form of] enlightenment used to be improved by 
faith”. When the tsar began to suppress superstition, faith lost this basis and “began to 
fall into dissolution” (Shcherbatov, 1969, p. 155).
Surprisingly, this excerpt is somewhat close to what Georg Wilhelm Hegel had 
to say about the Enlightenment attack on miracles some 50 years later: “When all 
prejudice and superstitions have been banished, the question arises: Now what? 
What is the truth which the Enlightenment has disseminated in place of these 
prejudices and superstitions?” (Outram, 2013, p. 114). Hegel saw a severe danger 
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in the Enlightenment’s reckless disregard for religion and was much concerned with 
the undesirable prospect of religion’s complete destruction. 
The great significance given to Christianization as a step forward from barbarism 
might seem quite counterintuitive when we talk about 18th-century thinkers. Indeed, 
many contemporary historians hold that the Enlightenment was “characterized by 
deliberate efforts to undermine religious belief and organizations” (Outram, 2013, 
p. 114). However, when we take a closer look at the issue, it becomes obvious that, 
while organized religion was indeed under attack from the best minds of the epoch, 
the significance and great influence of all the good religion brought (including literacy) 
was never disputed. Moreover, the fierce criticism of the Enlightenment was aimed 
mostly at “bad beliefs”, namely miracles and superstitions. The idea of an omnipotent 
God was rarely in doubt: even when it was challenged, the debates revolved around 
the question of God’s power and his willingness to intervene in the established laws of 
nature. As Keith Thomas argues, the Enlightenment view was confined to a God who 
worked “through natural causes” and “obeyed natural laws accessible to human study” 
(Thomas, 1983, p. 659). 
The real picture of the Enlightenment’s attitude towards religion is much 
more complex, especially if we depart from the views of a relatively small group 
of anti-religious French writers. In fact, Enlightenment thinkers provided different 
arguments to pursue a divergent set of purposes ranging from religious obscurantism 
to the promotion of religious orthodoxy. Furthermore, the Enlightenment saw the 
rise of powerful religious movements: The Great Awakening in North America, 
Pietism in Germany, English Methodism, and others. The Enlightenment did 
not see an absolute decline in religious belief, so there still existed grounds to 
regard Christianization as progress. Even the very first conception of civilization 
put forward by Victor Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau, in 1756 held that European 
civilization was based on Christian belief and its ideals (Ionov & Khachaturian, 
2002, p. 59). This notion reflects 16th- and 17th-century perceptions of religion and 
its role in the battle against barbarism. In this context, it is interesting to mention 
that 16th- and 17th-century Europeans “represented the [Russian] land as decidedly 
un-Christian, cruel and barbaric, Asian as opposed to European, and some even 
suggested that the Russians were in league with the Turks and Tartars to destroy 
Christianity” (Cross, 2012, p. 135).
To sum up, we should not be surprised that baptism was regarded as a giant 
leap towards enlightenment by Russian thinkers. As Immanuel Kant famously 
put it, “we are now not living in an enlightened age, but we do live in an age of 
enlightenment” (Kant, 1784, p. 491). Equally, Denis Diderot, a great philosopher 
of the French Enlightenment, wrote in his Sur la civilisation de Russie that the 
progress of civilisation is a result of a social development, and civilisation can not be 
established from without. Diderot believed that Russia had embarked on the path to 
enlightenment, although barbarism still had a considerable influence (Mezin, 2016, 
p. 62). So, we see that even the strongest proponents and most beautiful minds of 
the Enlightenment believed that process was far from concluded by the end of the 
18th century. Perhaps it had indeed started in the 10th century?
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Barbarism in Russia and Scandinavia: August Schlözer’s Perspective 
August Schlözer, one of the biggest enlightenment names in the field of Russian 
history, wrote what is probably the most elaborate piece on history of barbarism 
in Russia. Schlözer’s sources of inspiration were the works of Adam Ferguson. 
Schlözer admired the Scottish and English Enlightenment, could read English, and 
was acquainted not only with Ferguson’s treatises, but also with works by David 
Hume, Edward Gibbon, and other minor authors. He regularly reviewed new 
publications from the British Isles in the several journals he edited. 
Apart from his widely acclaimed book Nestor. Russische Annalen in ihrer 
Slavonischen Grundsprache verglichen, übersetzt und erklärt (Nestor. Russian 
Chronicles in the Old Russian Language Compared, Translated and Explained), 
Schlözer authored some publications on universal history. Especially popular was 
his 1779 children’s book Vorbereitung zur Weltgeschichte für Kinder (An Introduction 
to World History for Children). In this book Schlözer formulated (like Ferguson) five 
fundamental factors for social progress from savageness to civilized status: lifestyle, 
climate and nutrition, the form of government, religion, and experience (of a nation or 
neighboring nations) (Shlёtser, 1829).
At the turn of the 19th century, there were only a few authors who investigated 
Russian history within the Fergusonian (or British) paradigm of civilization. Semyon 
Desnitsky, a legal scholar at Moscow University, studied law in Glasgow and attended 
the lectures of Adam Smith. Desnitsky’s own research was not specifically aimed 
at the issue of barbarism or progress, but he formulated a theory of four stages in 
world history, quite like what Schlözer and Ferguson had put forward. According to 
Desnitsky, every society goes from primitiveness through nomadism and agriculture to 
commerce (Ionov & Khachaturian, 2002, pp. 110–113). A universalist, Desnitsky made 
no exceptions for Russian history. In this respect he was close to Russian masons 
such as Ivan Lopukhin (Prikazchikova, 2018, pp. 713–719). Nikolai Karamzin, whose 
works enjoyed great popularity in the first decades of the 19th century, was somewhat 
connected with British thought. Karamzin used the word civilisation (although in French) 
and understood progress as a steady process from barbarism to enlightenment.
Unlike all of the above, Schlözer went very deep into the details and conceived 
his own conception of the civilizational development of Ancient Russia, Scandinavia, 
and Eastern Europe. Although Schlözer did not mention the term civilization, he 
adopted Aufklärung (enlightenment) or Kultur instead: as I showed earlier, this was 
normal usage in the 18th-century Russian tradition. 
The theme of the first volume of Schlözer’s Nestor was the historical roots of nations. 
This was an important motif for early modern European historians. The creation of a 
glorious and ancient history was one of the most significant national tasks required 
of intellectuals. They had no doubts regarding the historical antiquity of nations. As 
Schlözer opined, “in the childhood of historical science [...] our great grandfathers 
assumed that since our ancestors have existed for more than 2,000 years, similarly 
[they assumed] each nation had to come into existence after the fall of the Tower of 
Babel” (Shlёtser, 1809, p. 60).
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2019, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 388–406 401
As I discussed above, in 18th-century Russia the idea that the greatness of a 
nation’s history was defined by its antiquity and the glorious deeds of their ancestors 
dominated. Therefore, Russian authors in the mid-18th century sought to describe, 
in as much detail as possible, the early history of the Slavs. All this was absolutely 
unacceptable to Schlözer. Indeed, he wrote his book as a refutation of the widespread 
and generally accepted reconstruction of the ancient history of the Slavs: “Better 
600 years of authentic history than 3,000 years of fairy tales and fables”, confirmed 
Schlözer in an earlier work from 1768 (Shlёtser, 1809, p. 60). 
Schlözer’s main idea was the savageness of the Slavs before Riurik formed his new 
state. He suggested that the early Slavs were like “the inhabitants of Siberia, California 
and Madagascar: split into small hordes and lacking a political order, relations with 
other tribes, literacy, art, and religion (or only having a foolish religion)” (Shlёtser, 1809, 
p. ND). His chief argument in favour of the savageness of the Slavs was theoretical: 
savageness is the natural condition of a people emerging from a primitive state. As 
Schlözer notes in his Universal History, all nations can be categorized as “savage, 
barbarian, or enlightened” (Shlёtser, 1829, p. 59).
This was the key moment in Schlözer’s historico-geographical views. He 
examined the social development of not only the Eastern Slavs but also of the 
entire region, which he dubbed “the High North”. Besides Rus, Poland, the Baltic, 
Denmark, and Scandinavia belonged to this area. The notion of the High North was a 
manifestation of Schlözer’s German-centric viewpoint. He juxtaposed this region with 
the Centre (Germany and Pannonia), which in turn was juxtaposed to the Northern 
Mediterranean (southern Europe), where the Greek states and the Roman Empire 
had once been located (Shlёtser, 1809, pp. LE–LZ). Step by step, these enlightened 
peoples had discovered and enlightened Europe: around the 9th century, in the times 
of Charlemagne, they had discovered the High North. 
According to Schlözer’s theoretical postulations, the majority of nations 
received enlightenment from without. “The Germans”, declared Schlözer in his 
Universal History, “were for 2,000 years half savage: The Romans educated them”. 
After Germany was enlightened, 
the Germans on this side of the Rhine, and especially in Francia, were appointed 
by fate to sow the first seeds of Enlightenment across the vast north-western 
world. Only with the help of the Germans did the Scandinavians begin, little by 
little, to become human. Prior to the arrival of the Normans, it seemed as if the 
Russian had been forgotten by the father of humanity because there, in the harsh 
north-western region, not one German landed on this side of Baltic Sea thanks to 
its great remoteness (Shlёtser, 1819, p. 178). 
After the arrival of the Scandinavians, Rus began to move from savagery to 
barbarism.
However, as I pointed out earlier, Schlözer argued that real enlightenment only 
began after baptism. This means that the real “enlighteners” of the Russian land 
were the Byzantines, from whom Rus accepted baptism in the 10th century. From the 
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Scandinavians “there remains not the slightest trace – even Scandinavian personal 
names disappear from the princely house after Igor and were replaced with Slavic 
ones” (Shlёtser, 1809, pp. 21–22). The Scandinavians had not been enlightened when 
they took over Novgorod in the 9th century. Their way out of barbarism had just started, 
so they could not transfer enlightenment to the Slavs. 
A heated dispute was sparked as soon as Schlözer’s book came out in Russian. 
His theories about the barbarism and savageness of the Slavs were heavily infused 
with the idea of a Scandinavian invasion at the beginning of Russian history, which 
provoked a negative response from the proto-Slavophiles and some conservatively 
oriented thinkers. They believed that Schlözer was driven by a prejudice that our Slavs 
were civilized by the Normans. At the same time, there were scholars like Karamzin 
and Mikhail Pogodin who followed the scheme and defended Schlözer and his ideas. 
Schlözer has long been a divisive figure in Russian historiography. 
Schlözer’s main idea was not confined only to enlightenment as a synonym for 
social progress. Thanks to him, the early centuries of Russian history were placed on 
the developmental scale, and the country, although barbarous, was seen as gradually 
overcoming backwardness. This means that Schlözer, like Ferguson earlier, did not 
see civilization as the antipode to barbarism, but rather as a new stage in unstoppable 
social development. In this context, even the most barbarous facts of Russian history 
(the Mongol yoke, slavery, tyranny) were no longer seen as insurmountable obstacles 
on the pathway to civilization. On the contrary, civilization was deemed an inevitable 
station on the road of history. Following Schlözer, Karamzin wrote about barbarism of 
the Slavs. According to him, this was not a reason for national embarrassment, but 
was rather a common stage for all nations (Karamzin, 1818, p. 27). Schlözer’s British 
sources shared the same view. William Tooke, describing Russians at the time of 
Prince Sviatoslav, concluded that they were barbarians: but “all nations have once 
been barbarians” (Tooke, 1800, p. 181). 
Conclusion
As we can see, enlightenment thinkers appropriated and enhanced a discourse on 
barbarism and civilization that had persisted in European thought for centuries. This 
discourse heavily influenced discussions about peripheral countries and cultures 
in the 18th century. There were numerous treatises discussing the exact position of 
Russia and its people among civilized/barbaric nations at the turn of the 19th century. 
Russian historical writers of the time followed the European fashion and reflected on 
the question. The word civilization may have not been incorporated into the Russian 
language before the 1830s, but, nevertheless, enlightenment was regarded as the 
antipode to barbarism. In this context, social development was often associated with 
Christianization, education, and the progress of morals. Russia’s place and role in 
European politics and culture were hotly disputed, and the assessment of the country’s 
level of development was an important matter for foreign and domestic thinkers.
This article was written as a contribution to a research project launched at Ural 
Federal University by a team of historians and philosophers. This project is dedicated 
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to concepts of conflict and concord in Russian and European intellectual spaces in 
the modern era. The very concept of conflict presupposes identifying the sides of any 
given encounter and the reasons for the clash. Civilizational differences (or at least as 
they appeared in the early 19th century) may well be regarded as such a reason. Such 
a difference shaped the ways in which each side understood one another and even 
helped develop the self-identities of both Russia and the West. Thus, the discourse 
on barbarism became a justification for Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812. The 
response to these ideas in Russian historical writings and media should not be omitted 
in future studies, both because of their potential in studying an early example of so-
called “information war” and as an essential preliminary to the discussion between the 
Slavophiles and the Westernizers that sparked off in the 1830s.
At the same time, the conception of “a broader European civilization”, which was 
put forward during Enlightenment discussions, worked as a staging ground for ideas 
of concord and peace between similar (“civilized”) cultures. The dichotomic idea of 
barbarism/civilization survived long after its 19th-century heyday: to an extent, it still 
contributes to a stereotypical image of the world today, although in most cases it is 
not articulated openly. So, I believe that this article and the broader research project 
may be useful not only for educational or academic purposes, but also for achieving a 
better understanding of others in the current tumultuous political climate.
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